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INTRODUCTION
The legal services industry is experiencing a fundamental transfor-
mation. Thirty years ago, legal markets were almost exclusively national;
today, a global legal market is emerging and evolving at a considerable
pace.' Unfortunately, further globalization is hindered by the failure of
national regulatory systems to respond effectively.
Globalization has made domestic regulation more difficult because it
increases the complexity of the interactions between lawyers, the legal
system, and the authorities responsible for regulating the legal profession.2
As the process of globalization has blurred the distinction between
national and international legal issues,3 an international regulatory regime
governing transnational legal practice has become essential. However,
national authorities have resisted the creation of such a regime, and
transnational legal practice remains largely unregulated.
Because the most important factor inhibiting the further globalization
of the legal services industry is the current structure of national regula-
tions,5 this Note proposes the creation of a system to impose multination-
al discipline on the exercise of authority by domestic regulators of the
legal profession. In Part I, the Note begins with a discussion of the
globalization of law firms and the expansion of international trade in
legal services. In Parts II and III, the Note describes the current state of
regulatory barriers facing lawyers in the United States, the European
Union (EU), and Japan and analyzes the difficulties of liberalizing
international trade in legal services. Part IV continues with an overview
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)6 and an analysis
of how it applies to trade in legal services. Finally, in Part V, the Note
offers a proposal for a multilateral regime-to govern international trade
1. John Toulmin, Our Worldwide Legal Profession, 37 L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Summer
1994, at 46, 46 [hereinafter Toulmin 1994].
2. David M. Trubek et al., Symposium: The Future of the Legal Profession: Global
Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation
of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407, 418 (1994) [hereinafter Future of the
Legal Profession].
3. See, e.g., Future of the Legal Profession, supra note 2, at 408; Richard L. Abel,
Symposium: The Future of the Legal Profession: Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 737, 748 (1994).
4. Abel, supra note 3, at 761-62.
5. GEZA FEKETEKUTY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 129-45 (1988); Geza
Feketekuty, Trade in Professional Services: An Overview, 1986 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 11
[hereinafter Feketekuty 1986].
6. General Agreement on Trade in Services, in Uruguay Round Final Act, Dec. 15, 1993,
Annex IB, GAIT Doe. No. MTN/FA, 33 I.L.M. 1130 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
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in legal services. Due to peculiarities of the legal services industry and
inherent negotiating difficulties, an Annex on Legal Services under the
GATS would be the most effective means available to bring about a
significant liberalization of trade in legal services.
I. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LAW FIRMS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN LEGAL SERVICES
Since the end of World War II, significant economic and political
events have fueled the globalization of law firms and spurred a cor-
responding increase in international trade in legal services. Table 1 shows
that as opportunities have emerged, law firms have responded.7 For
example, the first wave of U.S. lawyers to enter the European market
closely followed the enactment of the Marshall Plan.' Similarly, the
creation of major financial institutions, such as the Eurobond and
Eurodollar markets in the 1960s and 1970s, prompted many U.S. firms
to open branch offices in London and Paris.9
In the past decade the global expansion of law firms has been
remarkable.'0 U.S. firms have been especially aggressive.1' In 1980, 35
of the current 700 largest U.S. law firms maintained a total of 165
foreign offices. 2 By 1994, 114 of these firms supported 340 foreign
branches. 13
7. Data were compiled from profiles of the 700 largest U.S. law firms published in Law
Firm Profiles, OF COUNSEL 700, May 2-16, 1994, at 63. These data were supplemented with
firm profiles contained in LEXIS, Career Library, Empdir File (January 22, 1995) and with
telephone interviews with individual law firms. The data presented in this table has several
important limitations. First, coverage extends only to the foreign offices with at least one full-
time attorney of the largest 700 U.S.-based firms. Second, the totals for new offices are for new
offices that remained open through 1994. Thus, some undercoverage is expected because
several small firms have foreign branches and because many offices which were opened in
previous years, particularly during the late 1980s, were closed by 1994. The latter source of
undercoverage results in a reduction in the magnitude of the trends shown in Table 1.
8. Future of the Legal Profession, supra note 2, at 432.
9. THIERRY J. NOYELLE & ANNA B. DUTKA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN BUSINESS
SERVICES 42 (1988).
10. Abel, supra note 3, at 738.
11. Id.
12. Supra note 7.
13. Supra note 7.
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Table 2, which reflects the amount of U.S. legal services sold
abroad, 4 shows that between 1986 and 1993, U.S. exports in this sector
expanded from $97 to $1453 million. 5 Table 3, which reflects the
amount of foreign legal services purchased by U.S. citizens,' 6 shows that
U.S. imports of legal services simultaneously increased from $40 to $326
million. 7
Four recent events have triggered dramatic responses from U.S. law
firms: the announcement of the EC 1992 initiative, the relaxation of
regulatory barriers in Japan, the collapse of communism in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, and the development of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).18 As law firms expanded to take
advantage of these opportunities, trade in legal services simultaneously
increased.
A. EC 1992
Anticipation of the 1992 Single Market Program instigated a surge of
new office openings in Brussels during the late 1980s. Table 1 reveals
that between 1987 and 1993, the number of branch offices of U.S. law
firms in Brussels increased from 8 to 34. During the same period, the
total number of branch offices in all EC countries more than doubled,
from 66 to 134. More dramatically, Table 2 illustrates that U.S. exports
of legal services to the EC grew 1,124 percent during the period, from
$55 to $673 million. Finally, from 1987 to 1993, the total value of trade
in legal services between the United States and the EC expanded from
$66 to $809 million.
14. John A. Sondheimer & Sylvia E. Bargas, U.S. International Sales and Purchases of
Private Services, 74 SURv. CURRENT Bus., Sept. 1994, at 126-33 tbls. 9.1-9.4 [hereinafter
Sondheimer & Bargas 1994]; John A. Sondheimer & Sylvia E. Bargas, U.S. International Sales
and Purchases of Private Services, 73 SURV. CURRENT Bus., Sept. 1993, at 120, 122, 144-51
tbls. 9.1-9.4 [hereinafter Sondheimer & Bargas 1993]; John A. Sondheimer & Sylvia E. Bargas,
U.S. International Sales and Purchases of Private Services, 72 SURV. CURRENT Bus., Sept.
1992, at 116-21 tbls. 9.1-9.3 [hereinafter Sondheimer & Bargas 1992].
Currently, overseas sales of legal services represent one percent of total exports of U.S.
services and eleven percent of U.S. exports of professional services. Sondheimer & Bargas
1994, supra, at 101 tbl. 2, 132 tbl. 9.4.
15. Sondheimer & Bargas 1994, supra note 14, at 98, 132 tbl. 9.4; Sondheimer & Bargas
1992, supra note 14, at 82, 116 tWl. 9.1. All import and export data are reported in nominal
terms.
16. Sondheimer & Bargas 1994, supra note 14, at 126-33 tbls. 9.1-9.4; Sondheimer &
Bargas 1993, supra note 14, at 122, 144-52; Sondheimer & Bargas 1992, supra note 14, at
116-21 tbls. 9.1-9.3.
17. Sondheimer & Bargas 1994, supra note 14, at 133 tbl. 9.4; Sondheimer & Bargas
1992, supra note 14, at 117 tbl. 9.1.
18. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Nov. 4, 1993, 107 Stat.
2057 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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Liberalizing Trade in Legal Services
B. Japan
In 1987, Japan reduced the severity of its regulatory barriers against
foreign lawyers,19 resulting in an increase in the number of U.S. offices
in Tokyo from four to fifteen in one year. Table 1 shows that by 1991,
the number of U.S. firms with offices in Japan reached twenty-nine.
Table 2 demonstrates that from 1986 to 1991, U.S. exports of legal
services to Japan jumped from $11 to $360 million. The total amount of
trade in legal services between the two countries grew from $17 to $386
million over the same time period.
C. Eastern Europe
The opening of markets in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union brought a striking response by U.S. law firms. Table 1 reveals that
in the five years between 1989 and 1994, the number of U.S. offices in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union ballooned from four to fifty-
eight. Table 2 shows that U.S exports of legal services to the region grew
from $0 to $13 million between 1989 and 1993.
D. NAFTA
The negotiation and subsequent implementation of the NAFTA
prompted U.S. firms to open 14 new offices between 1988 and 1993;20
3 in Canada and 14 in Mexico, as shown in Table 1. Corresponding trade
figures from Tables 2 and 3 reveal that between 1988 and 1993, U.S.
exports of legal services to Canada rose from $20 to $97 million, while
exports to Mexico grew from $1 to $19 million. In addition, the total
amount of trade in legal services between the United States and its
NAFTA partners has expanded enormously, reaching $147 million by
1993.
Although the globalization of the legal services industry is particu-
larly visible when analyzing U.S. law firms, firms based in other coun-
tries are undergoing similar transformations.21 Non-U.S. firms, particularly
from large commercial centers, have recognized that they must compete
internationally and have responded to many of the same opportunities,
19. Abel, supra note 3, at 765.
20. See, e.g., Stephanie B. Goldberg, South of the Border, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at 74, 74-
77.
21. Abel, supra note 3, at 764-65; Roger J. Goebel, Professional Qualification and
Educational Requirements for Law Practice in a Foreign Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap,
63 TUL. L. REV. 443, 508 (1989) [hereinafter Goebel 1989].
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particularly the opening of markets in Eastern Europe and the adoption
of the Single Market Program.2 2 In addition, over fifty-five foreign-based
firms had established offices in the United States by 1993.23 Finally,
European law firms have a significant presence in Asian legal markets. 4
The response of the legal service sector to these events suggests that
significant opportunities for expanding trade exist if the remaining
impediments can be reduced or eliminated. As demonstrated below, a key
factor inhibiting further globalization is the existing regulatory structure
which governs national legal markets and the lack of multilateral dis-
cipline over the behavior of national regulators. Therefore, the establish-
ment of a global regulatory regime can be expected to foster the con-
tinued development of transnational legal practices, contribute to the
further globalization of law firms, and result in a marked increase in
global trade in legal services.
II. OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL REGULATION OF
FOREIGN LEGAL PROFESSIONALS
The regulation of lawyers has historically been a domestic policy
issue. In order to uphold the integrity of their laws and the judicial
systems, countries have enacted elaborate regulatory schemes to control
who may provide legal services and how they are provided.25 The
regulation of the legal profession varies significantly between countries
due to differences in culture, history, economics, and the structure of the
legal profession.26 An outgrowth of most systems of national regulation
of lawyers is the creation of a monopoly for qualified, domestic providers
of legal services.27 In most cases, the regulations not only prohibit
unqualified domestic persons from providing legal services but also
prevent foreign lawyers from entering the domestic market.
During the last two decades, globalization of the legal services
industry has increased the general awareness of the effects of national
22. Future of the Legal Profession, supra note 2, at 428, 435-36; Toulmin 1994, supra
note 1, at 47.
23. Compiled from A.B.A. GUIDE TO FOREIGN LAW FiRMs (James R. Silkenat & Howard
B. Hill eds., 2d ed. 1993). The ABA listing contains information about many of the major law
firms in some 130 countries; however, it is not intended to be complete. Thus, the presence of
foreign-based law firms is understated.
24. Abel, supra note 3, at 767-68, 850, 853.
25. Kelly C. Crabb, Note, Providing Legal Services in Foreign Countries: Making Room
for the American Attorney, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1767, 1788-89 (1983).
26. Gerald L. Greengard, Obstacles to the Implementation of the Treaty of Rome
Provisions for Transnational Legal Practice, 7 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 113, 123
(1985).
27. Crabb, supra note 25, at 1770.
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regulations, particularly as they affect foreign lawyers.2" Some measures
that restrict the activities of foreign lawyers are objectively justifiable,
based on the need to ensure the quality of legal services provided in the
domestic market.29 However, others are discriminatory and primarily
designed to shield the domestic industry from foreign competition.30 The
discussion below highlights some of the common barriers to international
trade in legal services.
A. Regulatory Measures Inhibiting Transnational Practice
The common regulatory measures which create barriers to trade in
legal services can be divided into three broad categories. 31 The first group
is comprised of measures designed to protect the public from unqualified
foreign attorneys and to compensate for differences in training across
legal systems. These measures include educational requirements, ex-
perience requirements, and restrictions on the types of legal advice that
a foreign lawyer is permitted to provide.
A second category includes regulations designed to hinder the ability
of otherwise qualified foreign lawyers and foreign law firms to provide
services in the domestic legal market. Such measures include dis-
criminatory taxes, personnel hiring restrictions, limitations on the use of
firm names by foreign firms, partnership and association restrictions, and
residency requirements.
The final group of regulations consists of measures that effectively
prohibit legal practice by foreign attorneys solely on the basis of their
nationality. These regulations include citizenship requirements for local
bar membership, limitations or prohibitions on foreign ownership, and
visa requirements.
B. Rationale Behind Restrictions on Trade in Legal Services
Governmental officials, local attorneys, and bar associations offer a
number of arguments for restricting the access of foreign lawyers to
28. Richard Self, Legal Services and the Emergence of a Service Economy: Practical and
Theoretical Considerations, 7 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 269, 276 (1985); American Bar
Association Section of International Law and Practice Report to the House of Delegates: Model
Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consultants, 28 INT'L LAW. 207, 212-13 (1994) [hereinafter
Model Rule].
29. Philip H. Gold, Note, Legal Problems in Expanding the Scope of GATT to Include
Trade in Services, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J. 281, 282 (1982-83).
30. Id.
31. This classification is based in part on Dean N. Menegas, GATT as a Framework for
Multilateral Negotiations on Trade in Legal Services, 7 MIcH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 277,
280-82 (1985).
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domestic legal markets.32 In developing their regulations, national gov-
ernments often justify their policies with both legitimate and illegitimate
arguments.33 The result is the enactment of a patchwork of regulations
which includes both reasonable and unnecessarily protectionist rules.34
Five common rationales upon which national authorities rely to deny
access to foreign attorneys are explained below.
1. Lack of National Loyalty and Shared Cultural Values
Legal systems and the provision of legal services are intimately
related to the history, politics, and culture of a nation.35 This is especially
true when the legal services involve the administration of justice through
the national court system3 6 and when the legal services affect the personal
and property rights of individual citizens.37 In such situations, national
authorities may have legitimate concerns about the involvement of legal
professionals who do not share the values of the local community,
because their activities may frustrate attempts to achieve "justice," as it
is locally understood.38
2. Lack of Necessary Competence
National authorities have articulated two related reasons for ques-
tioning the competence of foreign attorneys. First, because they do not
have control over the foreign country's educational standards or certifica-
tion procedures, national authorities may have general concerns about the
foreign attorney's competence to practice law.39 Second, because attorneys
are formally trained only in the law of their domestic jurisdiction and not
in the law of foreign countries, national authorities may have specific
concerns about the competence of foreign attorneys to practice domestic
law. This anxiety is magnified when fundamental differences exist
between the respective legal systems.'
32. Crabb, supra note 25, at 1788-89.
33. Patrick Stewart, Trade War Looms Over International Legal Services, 10 INT'L FIN.
L. REV. 19, 19 (1991).
34. Id.
35. Greengard, supra note 26, at 123.
36. Crabb, supra note 25, at 1770.
37. Id. at 1789.
38. Id. at 1789-90.
39. Id. at 1795-96.
40. For example, substantial differences exist between systems based on civil and common
law.
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3. Inability to Redress Injury to Citizens
by Foreign Attorneys
Malpractice by foreign attorneys poses serious potential problems for
national regulators.4 ' Foreign attorneys may not be accustomed to local
ethics rules, which may differ from or conflict with the rules in the
lawyer's home jurisdiction, potentially making them more susceptible to
malpractice claims.42 Furthermore, judgments against foreign attorneys
may be impossible to enforce if the attorneys in question do not have sig-
nificant ties to the foreign country. 3
4. Interference with the Development of the
Domestic Legal Industry
Local authorities sometimes express concern that foreign lawyers and
firms will overwhelm the local firms, stifling the development of the local
bar.44 This argument is essentially an "infant industry" argument applied
to the legal services industry. 45 However, substantial evidence suggests
that isolating a domestic industry from competition prevents it from
building the necessary skills to compete successfully in the global
market.46
5. Lack of Reciprocal Access to Foreign Legal Markets
Concerns about reciprocal access to legal markets represent significant
barriers to transnational practice. 47 National bar associations tend not to
want foreign lawyers to be able to compete in the local legal market if
domestic lawyers are kept out of the foreign lawyer's home legal
market.4 Asymmetric access to legal markets combined with the inherent
difficulty of assessing the degree of openness of individual legal markets
represent a fundamental obstacle to greater liberalization of trade in legal
services.49
41. Crabb, supra note 25, at 1801.
42. Nevertheless, it should be noted that no serious malpractice complaints were filed
against foreign lawyers in any of four major European cities. Abel, supra note 3, at 752.
43. Crabb, supra note 25, at 1801.
44. Id. at 1806.
45. Feketekuty 1986, supra note 5, at 4.
46. Abel, supra note 3, at 748.
47. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 215.
48. Abel, supra note 3, at 758.
49. Stewart, supra note 33, at 20; see infra part IV.A.
Spring 19951
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C. Benefits of Liberalizing Domestic Regulations
Progress toward liberalizing international trade in legal services will
be beneficial to domestic and foreign lawyers and will strengthen national
legal service industries. Specifically, reducing barriers against foreign
lawyers should serve the interests of consumers, increase the competitive-
ness of domestic law firms, and facilitate international transactions. Four
key benefits are discussed below.
1. Benefits to Domestic Consumers of Legal Services
The most visible effect of governmental regulation of legal services
is that it typically results in the establishment of a cartel in the domestic
legal services market - complete with high barriers to entry, restrictive
practices, and monopoly pricing.50 In cartelized markets, prices paid by
consumers tend to be higher and fewer goods or services tend to be
provided than in competitive markets." Thus, when national'authorities
constrain access to the domestic legal market by foreign providers, they
limit the amount of legal services available and increase the price of such
services to consumers.5 ' The higher prices and the reduced quantity of legal
services supplied may leave the needs of some consumers unsatisfied.53
Furthermore, the cartelization of domestic legal markets makes local
lawyers relatively unresponsive to the demands of legal consumers. 4
Particularly in the fields of international law and commercial transactions,
the presence of foreign lawyers creates a powerful incentive for domestic
lawyers to increase their capabilities, knowledge, and service.55 Thus, if
domestic and foreign lawyers are able to compete, the quality of services
rendered to clients can be expected to improve.
50. John Heilemann, Survey of the Legal Profession, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 3, 4.
51. RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 249 (10th ed. 1993). In addition, experimental
evidence shows that consumers tend to receive fewer of the benefits of innovation when markets
are imperfectly competitive. R. Mark Isaac & Stanley S. Reynolds, Schumpeterian Competition
in Experimental Markets, 17 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 59, 91 (1992).
52. Abel, supra note 3, at 748.
53. For example, some Japanese believe that the result of their system that strictly controls
the number of lawyers and access to litigation-based remedies is a deficiency of justice.
Heilemann, supra note 50, at 4; Tasuku Matsuo, Globalization Demands Opening to Foreign
Lawyers; Restrictions Protect Domestic Profession Not Clients, NIKKEI WKLY., December 21,
1992, at 7.
54. Abel, ,4upra note 3, at 748. For example, in response to greater competition, domestic
firms may increase the number of hours worked and change their billing practices to satisfy the
preferences of their clients. Id.
55. Id.; Peter Roorda, The Internationalization of the Practice of Law, 28 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 141, 146 (1993).
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A study of the effects of the deregulation of legal services in housing
conveyances in Great Britain provides some insights into the potential
benefits of terminating a cartel in a legal services market. 6 The study
demonstrated that price discrimination became more difficult and costs to
consumers decreased by about one-third as competition increased. 7 In
addition, the authors suggested that the quality of service increased at all
price levels due to deregulation.58 Although the study was narrow in
scope, it is important evidence that both commercial entities and in-
dividuals could benefit substantially from increased competition in the
legal services industry.
2. Improving the Efficiency of the Legal Services Industry
Legal services are an integral part of commercial transactions. 9 An
inevitable result of greater economic integration is larger numbers of
commercial transactions involving multinational clients who want advice
on transnational concerns. In such transactions, local law problems are
often either integrated into or accessory to the international issues. 
6
Segmented markets for legal services increase costs of these transactions
not only by necessitating the employment of separate attorneys in each
jurisdiction involved in the transaction but also by inhibiting the acquisi-
tion of multi-jurisdictional expertise by lawyers.6' Thus, direct benefits of
liberalizing trade in legal services include greater efficiency in the
provision of legal services and a consequential reduction in the costs of
conducting trade in goods and other services.
3. Facilitating International Transactions
Liberalization of trade in legal services will also provide indirect
benefits to the world trading system. By creating greater opportunities to
56. Simon Domberger & Avrom Sherr, The Impact of Competition on Pricing and Quality
of Legal Services, 9 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 41, 41 (1989).
57. Id. at 55.
58. Id.
59. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1994 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT OF FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 167 (1994) [hereinafter USTR REPORT]; Goebel 1989,
supra note 21, at 447.
60. Goebel 1989, supra note 21, at 511. For example, experienced transnational lawyers
are often required to facilitate capital movements, foreign investment, and international trade
transactions, and to resolve tax issues. Roger J. Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community:
Progress Towards Community-Wide Rights of Practice, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 556, 556-57
(1991-92) [hereinafter Goebel 1992].
61. Goebel 1992, supra note 60, at 556-57; John H. Barton, Negotiation Patterns for
Liberalizing International Trade in Professional Services, 1986 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103-04.
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become experienced in addressing multi-jurisdictional legal problems,
liberalization will enable lawyers more effectively to "bridge the cultural
gap" that exists in many international transactions.62 A myriad of issues
can arise when constructing a transaction that must satisfy requirements
of two or more legal systems with differing experiences, traditions, and
institutions .63 Greater exposure to multi-jurisdictional problems will make
lawyers more effective in serving their clients.
4. Strengthening National Legal Institutions
A final benefit of reducing the barriers to international trade in legal
services is that international competition appears to strengthen domestic
legal institutions, particularly domestic law firms. For example, an
increase in international competition is thought to have contributed
significantly to the strengthening of German and Canadian law firms and
to an improvement in their international competitiveness.54 Conversely,
Japanese law firms, which operate in a heavily regulated and relatively
closed domestic legal market, remain small and tend to be less com-
petitive internationally. 65 In addition to strengthening law firms, greater
openness appears to help countries maintain an independent legal
system.6
D. Summary
Any attempt to liberalize trade in legal services must strike a balance
between the concerns of national regulators regarding the practice of
foreign attorneys and the benefits of increased international competition
in the global legal market. Some of the restrictions imposed on foreign
lawyers by national regulators are objectively justifiable and facilitate the
effective and reliable provision of legal services in the domestic market.
Such restrictions should not be sacrificed in an attempt to increase in-
ternational competition. However, many of the restrictions on foreign
lawyers are unreasonably discriminatory and should be eliminated. The
primary goal of the proposal outlined below is to preserve sufficient
flexibility for domestic regulators to ensure the competent and efficient
provision of legal services in their market while substantially increasing
international competition.
62. Goebel 1989, supra note 21, at 447.
63. Id. at 448-50.
64. Future of the Legal Profession, supra note 2, at 447-48; Abel, supra note 3, at 781.
65. Abel, supra note 3, at 767.
66. Barton, supra note 61, at 104.
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III. NATIONAL BARRIERS TO TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICES IN THE
UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND JAPAN
During the last decade, trade in legal services became a significant
trade issue for the United States, the Member States of the EU, and
Japan.67 In international negotiations over legal services, these countries
have been the most active participants.' 8 This section briefly outlines the
regulation of foreign lawyers within the United States, the EU, and Japan
and describes the international trade conflicts that have developed among
them.
A. The United States
It is relatively difficult for foreign attorneys to practice law in the
United States.69 The credentialling and disciplining of attorneys is con-
trolled by each state through its court system or integrated bar associa-
tion.7" Although each state has enacted its own set of requirements, in
most states foreign lawyers cannot practice law, even the law of their
home country, unless they are full members of the state bar.7
However, the U.S. legal market is gradually opening. In 1973, the
U.S. Supreme Court waived the citizenship requirement for admission to
state bars.72 Furthermore, sixteen states and the District of Columbia
permit foreign lawyers to become licensed foreign legal consultants. 73 As
a legal consultant, a foreign lawyer may conduct an international practice
in the United States without passing the bar examination or becoming a
full member of the state bar, subject to some limitations.74 In 1994, the
67. See, e.g., Karen Dillon, Sacrificing U.S. Lawyers for the GATr, RECORDER, July 6,
1994, at 10; Goebel 1989, supra note 21, at 507.
68. Toulmin 1994, supra note 1, at 52.
69. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 212-13.
70. Christopher J. Caywood, A Federal Bar for Foreign Lawyers, 7 MICH. Y.B. INT'L
LEGAL STUD. 129, 132 (1985).
71. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 213. Currently, the only way a foreign lawyer may
practice law in the United States, with some limited exceptions, is to "attend an accredited law
school, sit for the bar examination, and become a full member of the bar." Id.; see also Crabb,
supra note 25, at 1789.
72. In re Griffiths, 412 U.S. 717 (1973).
73. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 212-15; Dillon, supra note 67, at 10. The sixteen states
are: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. Model Rule, supra
note 28, at 212-15. A number of states have conditioned eligibility for the status of foreign
legal consultant on reciprocal access for U.S. lawyers to the candidate's home legal market. Id.
at 215.
74. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 215. The most important limitation is that foreign legal
consultants generally may not practice local law. Id.
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American Bar Association (ABA) issued a Model Rule in an effort to
encourage harmonization of state regulations over legal consultants.
75
Although the Model Rule is not binding on any jurisdiction, the ABA
resolution which accompanied the Model Rule urges all United States
jurisdictions to adopt rules for licensing legal consultants which conform
to the language of the Model Rule.76
B. The European Union
Within the EU, the credentialling and disciplining of foreign attorneys
is primarily the responsibility of the authorities of the individual Member
States. The treatment of foreign lawyers varies considerably among the
Members of the EU. For example, barriers to entry are relatively low in
the United Kingdom and Belgium77 and relatively high in Germany. 78 Al-
though credentialling remains largely the prerogative of the Member
States, the EU has implemented Union-wide programs to reduce barriers
to transnational practice.79 These initiatives substantially facilitate the
ability of lawyers from Member States to practice law throughout the
EU.8 ° However, they have not improved access to EU legal markets for
lawyers from non-Member State countries.8'
In the EU, the effort to establish Union-wide rights of practice for
attorneys from Member States is closely linked to the overall goal of
achieving a fully integrated market within the EU, with complete
freedom of movement for persons, goods, services, and capital.83 In the
past twenty years, four significant initiatives were launched to facilitate
the transnational activities of EU lawyers.
75. Id. at 208-12.
76. Id. at 207.
77. Bryant G. Garth, Transnational Legal Practice and Professional Ideology, 7 MICH.
Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 3, 7-8 (1985).
78. Abel, supra note 3, at 801.
79. Jonathan Barsade, The Effect of EC Regulations upon the Ability of U.S. Lawyers to
Establish a Pan-European Practice, 28 INT'L LAW. 313, 318 (1994).
80. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 218.
81. Barsade, supra note 79, at 322. Nevertheless, for lawyers from non-EU countries,
transnational practice is possible. Roorda, supra note 55, at 150. Some U.S. lawyers have even
developed practices that involve advising clients on matters of European law. Id. Furthermore,
a few foreign firms handle litigation before the European Court of Justice in conjunction with
an associate admitted in any EU country. Id.
82. Goebel 1992, supra note 60, at 559.
83. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 3(c), 298
U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
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In 1977, the EC adopted the Legal Services Directive.84 The Services
Directive was the first significant institutional step taken to liberalize
trade in legal services within the EC.85 The most notable provisions of the
Services Directive allow qualified lawyers, who are nationals of a
Member State, to provide a broad range of cross-border legal services,
including advice on local law.86 The Services Directive effectively
eliminated most obstacles to engaging in a transnational legal practice
within the EC.87
In 1988, all Member States of the European Economic Community
adopted a code of professional ethics for EC lawyers.88 The CCBE Code
was developed by the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the
European Community89 and serves as a framework of principles of
professional conduct that apply to all cross-border activities of EC
lawyers. 9' The Code resolved the problem of how to decide cross-jurisdic-
tional ethical issues by requiring lawyers to abide by the terms of the
CCBE Code or the more restrictive local code, if applicable. 9' Many
members of the CCBE and the ABA believe that a worldwide code of
profess ional ethics, similar to the CCBE Code, could be negotiated. 92
In 1989, the Council of Ministers adopted the Directive on Recogni-
tion of Higher Education Diplomas.93 The purpose of the Directive was
to facilitate the ability of professionals to pursue their professions in other
Member States.94 Under the Directive, an EC national admitted to the bar
in a Member State may become a full member of the bar of any other
Member State provided that the lawyer passes an aptitude test.
95
84. Council Directive 77/249, 1977 O.J. (L 78) 17 [hereinafter Services Directive].
85. Toulmin 1994, supra note 1, at 49.
86. Barsade, supra note 79, at 321; Toulmin 1994, supra note 1, at 49.
87. Barsade, supra note 79, at 319-21.
88. John Toulmin, A Worldwide Code of Professional Ethics, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 673,
673 (1991-1992) [hereinafter Toulmin 1992]; see also CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, reprinted in Toulmin 1992, supra, at 686 (1988) [hereinafter
CCBE CODE].
89. The Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community (CCBE)
serves as an umbrella organization of national delegations from the legal communities of all
12 EU states and the European Economic Area countries. Cyprus, Hungary, Switzerland, and
the Czech and Slovak Republics are observers. The CCBE was designed to bring the concerns
of the legal profession to the attention of the EU. Toulmin 1994, supra note 1, at 48.
90. Toulmin 1992, supra note 88, at 673.
91. Goebel 1992, supra note 60, at 627-28.
92. Toulmin 1992, supra note 88, at 685; Barsade, supra note 79, at 325.
93. Council Directive 89/48, 1989 O.J. (L 19/16).
94. Barsade, supra note 79, at 318.
95. Id. The Directive allows Member States to require lawyers from other Member States
to either undergo an adaptation period or pass an aptitude test before being admitted to the bar.
Id. Most Members have elected to require the passage of an aptitude test. Id.
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Finally, to further advance the goal of complete freedom of move-
ment for lawyers throughout the EC, the CCBE drafted a directive on the
right of establishment for EC lawyers.96 The CCBE Draft Directive
proposes a set of rules to govern the establishment of EC lawyers within
EC Member States. 97 Its terms do not affect the rights of lawyers from
non-Member States.9" Currently the CCBE Draft Directive is being
discussed and revised within the EC Commission.99
C. Japan
In Japan, the barriers to entry faced by foreign attorneys are ex-
tremely high. 1° Of the industrialized countries, Japan's regulations on
foreign lawyers are the most stringent and discriminatory.' The
credentialling, supervision, and discipline of lawyers is governed by the
Federation of Japanese Bar Associations, the Nichibenren. 102 Any foreign
attorney who wishes to practice in Japan must secure the approval of the
Ministry of Justice and the Nichibenren.
10 3
The rules governing foreign attorneys in Japan are contained in the
Special Measures Law Concerning the Handling of Legal Business by
Foreign Lawyers, which was enacted in 1987."o Under the Special
Measures Law foreign lawyers are strictly prohibited from practicing
96. Id. at 321-22. CCBE DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT FOR LAWYERS,
reprinted in 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 699, 711 (1991-1992) [hereinafter CCBE DRAFT DIREC-
TIVE].
97. For a more detailed discussion of the CCBE Draft Directive, see infra part IV.A.
98. Barsade, supra note 79, at 322.
99. Toulmin 1994, supra note 1, at 50.
100. USTR REPORT, supra note 59, at 167; Abel, supra note 3, at 765. Each year
approximately three percent of applicants pass the national bar examination. Heilemann, supra
note 50, at 13-14.
101. Except for a few attorneys admitted to practice between 1945 and 1955, foreign
attorneys were forbidden to practice prior to 1986. Annie Eun-ah Lee, Note, Toward
Institutionalization of Reciprocity in Transnational Legal Services: A Proposal for a Multi-
lateral Convention under the Auspices of the GATT, 13 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 91,
104-07 (1990); Abel, supra note 3, at 765.
102. Lee, supra note 101, at 110. The Nichibenren is particularly powerful, because it was
created by statute and vested with broad supervisory and disciplinary authority. Christopher
Sheehey, Note, Japan's New Foreign Lawyer Law, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 361, 379
(1987). Because it functions as a private professional association as well as a quasi-govern-
mental regulatory agency, the Nichibenren is effectively immune from oversight. Id.
103. Lee, supra note 101, at 110.
104. Gaikoku Bengoshi niyoru Horitsujimu no Toriatsukai ni kansuru Tokubetsusochi Ho,
(Act Providing Special Measures for Handling Legal Business by Foreign Lawyers), in 2 Z.
KITAGAWA, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN app. at 613 (1987) [hereinafter Special Measures Law];
see, e.g., Susan Sayuri Kigawa, Note, Gaikoku Bengoshi Ho, Foreign Lawyers in Japan: The
Dynamics Behind Law No. 66, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1489 (1989).
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Japanese law,'05 employing or entering into partnership or fee-sharing
arrangements with Japanese lawyers,'06 using their official firm names,'0 7
or appearing in Japanese courts.108 In addition, foreign lawyers wishing
to practice in Japan must have at least five years of experience prior to
entering the country'0 9 Finally, the Special Measures Law conditions the
ability of a foreign lawyer to practice in Japan on reciprocal treatment of
Japanese lawyers in the foreign lawyer's home country.1
In December 1993, the Nichibenren approved several proposals to
modify the regulations governing foreign lawyers."' These reforms were
very minor"2 and were rejected by the Ministry of Justice because they
conflicted with governmental policy encouraging deregulation." 3 The
Ministry of Justice then drafted and submitted its own proposal to the
parliament.' The reforms that were incorporated into the Ministry of
Justice proposal would permit Japanese and foreign law firms to establish
joint offices and would relax the reciprocity requirement." 5 Although the
terms of the reforms have not been finalized and the parliament has yet
to act, substantial restrictions are expected to remain.
IV. INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES OVER LEGAL SERVICES
Recently, attempts to liberalize international trade in legal services
have been conducted in a number of contexts. For example, the United
States and the EU have exerted substantial pressure on Japanese officials
in bilateral, trilateral and multilateral discussions to reduce restrictions on
foreign lawyers. 1 6 In addition, the United States and the EU have
105. Special Measures Law, supra note 104, at 613.
106. USTR REPORT, supra note 59, at 167. However, Japanese lawyers may employ
foreign lawyers. Goebel 1989, supra note 21, at 484.
107. USTR REPORT, supra note 59, at 167; Goebel 1989, supra note 21, at 484.
108. Lee, supra note 101, at 104. The Special Measures Law also constrains the ability
of foreign lawyers to represent parties in arbitrations conducted under Japanese law. USTR
REPORT, supra note 59, at 167.
109. USTR REPORT, supra note 59, at 167. Legal experience acquired in Japan may not
be counted toward the five year requirement. Id.
110. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 214.
111. Hobart McK. Birmingham & Thomas R. Radcliffe, Japan Invites Lawyers... Sort
of, Bus. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 55.
112. Id.
113. Bill Drafted to Permit Foreign Lawyers to Practice in Japan, DAILY YOMIYURI,
March 17, 1994, at 12.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. As a result of heavy pressure by the U.S. government and the ABA, the Special
Measures Law was enacted in 1987. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 215-16. More recently, the
United States and the EU have sought relaxation of certain restrictions of the Special Measures
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engaged in extensive negotiations to obtain geographically broader access
to each other's legal services markets." 7
A. The Fundamental Problem of Reciprocity
Progress toward liberalization has been. limited due in large part to
conflicts over "reciprocity."'"8 In general, national authorities have been
unwilling to provide greater access to foreign lawyers unless they are
confident that their lawyers will receive functionally equivalent rights of
access to foreign legal markets." 9
Reciprocity has inhibited the liberalization of trade in legal services
in two distinct ways. First, reciprocity-related concerns have increased the
magnitude of the challenges faced by the negotiators."2 National
authorities are very reluctant to tolerate asymmetric access to legal
markets. Nevertheless, negotiators are often constrained in their ability to
address these concerns. It is frequently unclear whether negotiators have
the authority to commit to opening the domestic legal market when
national officials do not have direct control over the licensing of legal
professionals. When national authorities do not control the licensing of
legal professionals, negotiators are predictably unconvinced by the
assurances of their trading partners that commitments to open domestic
legal markets will be implemented.'12 This dilemma is currently an issue
in the United States and in the EU, because the primary authority for
setting rules governing lawyers resides at the state and Member State
level, respectively. 22
Second, even when countries purport to liberalize their rules, access
to the domestic market may not improve if reciprocity requirements are
incorporated into the rules. For example, although sixteen U.S. states
have enacted laws creating foreign legal consultant status, states typically
have conditioned this status on reciprocal access to the foreign market for
state lawyers. 23 Similarly, under Japan's Special Measures Law, a
Law in bilateral and trilateral negotiations, as well as in the multilateral negotiations leading
up to the formation of the GATS. Toulmin 1994, supra note 1, at 52; Dillon, supra note 67,
at 10.
117. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 214-15; Dillon, supra note 67, at 11.
118. Stewart, supra note 33, at 20; Model Rule, supra note 28, at 214-15.
119. Stewart, supra note 33, at 20-21; Model Rule, supra note 28, at 215.
120. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 384 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter LEGAL PROBLEMS].
121. Stewart, supra note 33, at 20.
122. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 212-17; Toulmin 1994, supra note 1, at 51; Stewart,
supra note 33, at 20.
123. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 215.
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prerequisite for access to the Japanese legal market is reciprocal access
for Japanese lawyers. 24 This network of reciprocity provisions results in
"lowest common denominator liberalization," in which liberalization
proceeds no faster than the rate at which the most restrictive country is
willing to liberalize its ruls. 2
5
The problem of lowest c6mmon denominator liberalization is ex-
pected to impede significantly the liberalization of legal service markets
under GATS.
B. Legal Services and the General Agreement
on Tr;de in Services
When the GATS became effective on January 1, 1995, global trade
in service sectors became subject to legally enforceable, multilateral
discipline for the first time. 126 With the GATS, the Members sought "to
establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in
services with a view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of
transparency and progressive liberalization.' 2 7
1. Uruguay Round Negotiations and Legal Services
Legal services were included in the GATS negotiations at the in-
sistence of the United States." a Given the substantial differences among
national regulatory systems, U.S. negotiators initially envisioned a special
annex on legal services, similar to the Annex on Financial Services, to
specifically address the regulatory barriers facing lawyers. 129 Under the
terms of the GATS, obligations of such an annex would be binding on all
GATS members and would have required all GATS members to afford
foreign lawyers some minimum level of access to their legal markets. 30
Ultimately, the U.S. approach in the multilateral negotiations was
rejected.' 3 ' Instead, in the approach that was adopted in the final version
of the GATS, trade in legal services is governed by the same rules that
apply to most other service sectors. 32 Under these rules, the opening of
124. Id. at 214; see also supra note 11.
125. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 216.
126. President Clinton's Submission to Congress of Documents Concerning Uruguay
Round Agreement, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 15, 1993).
127. GATS, supra note 6, at 3.
128. Toulmin 1994, supra note 1, at 52.
129. Stewart, supra note 33, at 19.
130. GATS, supra note 6, pt. II, art. XXIX.
131. Stewart, supra note 33, at 19; Dillon, supra note 67, at 10-11.
132. Stewart, supra note 33, at 19.
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legal markets to foreign lawyers is achieved through a multilateral
negotiation process, with Members offering improved access to their legal
markets in exchange for concessions from other Members. The level of
liberalization actually achieved in any given service sector, including
legal services, will vary from country to country, depending on the
outcome of various "horsetrades" during tle negotiation process.
2. Overview of the GATS
The GATS has two basic components. The first component estab-
lishes a framework for regulating trade in services and contains a set of
general multilateral rules that apply to national regulations governing such
trade.'33 This component also contains a series of annexes that address
issues in certain service sectors.' 34 The second component consists of a
set of schedules which lists specific commitments that apply to the
service sectors that Members have agreed to include in their schedules. '
35
The basic strategy of the GATS for liberalizing trade has been
described as a "positive list" approach.136 Unless an industry is scheduled,
it is automatically excluded from many of the most meaningful terms of
the GATS.'37 However, once a Member includes a sector in its schedule,
all of the obligations incorporated in the GATS apply to the sector, unless
the Member lists a specific exception in its schedule. 38 Under this
system, achieving significant trade liberalization requires Members both
to include sectors in their schedules and to progressively reduce the level
of trade barriers in scheduled sectors over time. Several of the key
aspects of the GATS are outlined below.
a. Most Favored Nation Obligation
The unconditional Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligation is a core
general obligation of the GATS: 13 each service supplier from a Member
133. Bernie Hoekman, The General Agreement on Trade in Services, in LEGAL PROBLEMS,
supra note 120, at 921-24.
134. GATS, supra note 6, at 28-37. It is expected that the Annex on Legal Services
proposed in this Note, if adopted, would be added to this portion of the Agreement.
135. Hoekman, supra note 133, at 922.
136. Harry G. Broadman, GATS: The Uruguay Round Accord on International Trade and
Investment in Services, 17 WORLD EcoN. 281, 286 (1994); J. Arkell, The General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) Liberalisation Concepts, Structures and Modalities, at 10 (Nov.
18-19, 1994) (paper presented at The Uruguay Round Results: A European Lawyers'
Perspective, College of Europe, on file with authors).
137. Broadman, supra note 136, at 286.
138. Arkell, supra note 136, at 10.
139. Hoekman, supra note 133, at 921-24.
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must receive from other Members treatment no less favorable than is
accorded to other foreign service suppliers."4 This obligation applies to
trade in all service sectors covered by the GATS, 14' regardless of whether
the Member has undertaken specific commitments in a sector. 42
In the Uruguay Round negotiations, a number of Members expressed
concerns about the unconditional MFN obligation because it allows
"countries with restrictive policies to [maintain] their status quo and 'free
ride' in the markets of more open countries.' 43 To address this problem,
an Annex on Article II Exemptions was created which specifies condi-
tions under which a Member may be exempted from the MFN obliga-
tions.144 The Annex provided Members with a one-time opportunity at the
entry into force of the GATS to unilaterally create MFN exceptions with
respect to other Members. 45 Without such an exception, service providers
from all Members must receive MFN treatment. 146
b. Specific Commitments
In addition to creating general obligations, 47 the GATS also provides
a legal basis for negotiating the multilateral elimination of barriers to
trade in services.148 For most service industries, the primary impediments
to trade are embedded in the regulatory systems of Members which
restrict the access of foreign suppliers of services to domestic markets and
which provide competitive advantages to domestic suppliers. 49 The
GATS negotiations are designed to improve market access and to reduce
140. GATS, supra note 6, pt. II, art. II. It should be emphasized that MFN only requires
that all foreign suppliers be treated uniformly; it does not require domestic and foreign service
providers to receive the same treatment.
141. Article I defines the scope of the Agreement and establishes which sectors are
covered. Id. art. I. "Virtually all existing services are included in the GATS framework."
Broadman, supra note 136, at 287; see also supra note 19.
142. GATS, supra note 6, art. II; Broadman, supra note 136, at 287.
143. Hoekman, supra note 133, at 922.
144. Id.
145. GATS, supra note 6, Annex on Article II Exemptions. After the entry into force of
the Agreement, MFN exemptions must be authorized under the terms of the WTO. Id.
146. The following countries have invoked an MFN exemption for Legal Services: Brunei
Darussalam, GATS/EL/95 (on file with authors); China, GATS/EL/19 (on file with authors);
Dominican Republic, GATS/ELJ28 (on file with authors); and Singapore, GATS/EU/76 (on file
with authors).
147. Part of the GATS provides for general obligations including transparency, and
ensuring that domestic regulations are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial
manner. GATS, supra note 6, pt. II, arts. Ill & IV. Where specific commitments are made
regarding professional services, Members shall establish procedures to verify the competence
of professionals of other Members. Id. art. IV, § 6.
148. Broadman, supra note 136, at 285.
149. Id.
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discrimination against service suppliers based on nationality." ° Con-
sequently, "[tihe negotiations on national treatment and market access for
services in the GATS constitute the equivalent of tariff negotiations for
goods in the [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. 151
(i) Market Access
Market Access is a negotiated right and obligation under the
GATS. 52 A Member is obliged to provide market access to services
suppliers from other Members only in those sectors which the Member
has included in its schedule. 53 Although market access is not defined
under the GATS, Members satisfy their market access obligation by
agreeing to forego six types of regulatory measures.-
(ii) National Treatment
National Treatment is a second negotiated right and obligation under
the GATS. 55 If a Member includes a service sector in its schedule of
National Treatment obligations, that Member must "accord to services
and services suppliers of any other Member . .. treatment no less
favourable than that it accords to its own like services and services
suppliers."'' 56 This obligation essentially prohibits discrimination against
foreign providers of services.
c. Negotiation Process
The scheduling of market access and National Treatment commit-
ments is accomplished through a process of multilateral trade negotia-




153. GATS, supra note 6, art. XVI.
154. The six prohibited measures are limitations on: (1) the number of service suppliers
allowed in a sector; (2) the total value of service transactions or assets in a sector; (3) the total
quantity of service output; (4) the number of persons that may be employed; (5) the type of
legal entity through which a'service supplier may supply a service; and (6) the participation of
foreign capital in terms of a maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total
value of foreign investment. GATS, supra note 6, art. XV.
155. Broadman, supra note 136, at 286.
156. GATS, supra note 6, art. XVII.
157. Broadman, supra note 136, at 285. This process begins with each Member submitting
a "request list" which identifies the concessions (specified by sector) that the Member desires
from others. Then, each country develops an "offer list," based on the requests it has received,
which identifies the concessions it would be willing to make in exchange for receiving
favorable treatment of its requests. Finally, the Members engage in a series of bilateral
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During the process of such negotiations, each Member seeks to barter
improved access to specific service sectors of other Members in exchange
for improving access to its own service sectors; 158 cross-sectoral ex-
changes159 facilitate agreement. Because each Member's final schedule
will reflect this bartering process, the degree of trade liberalization in any
given sector will vary significantly across different Members' schedules.
C. Prospects for Liberalization of Trade in Legal
Services under the GATS
Until the final stages of the Uruguay Round negotiations, some hope
existed that the negotiations would produce a reduction of barriers to
trade in legal services.' 6 In fact, many Members, including the United
States,'6' the EC, 62 and Japan,' 63 actually included legal services in their
schedules of specific commitments. 64 However, an examination of their
schedules reveals that the GATS does not substantially improve the
ability of lawyers to engage in transnational practice because, in most
cases, the commitments merely preserved existing regulatory measures.
65
negotiations in which offers are adjusted until all Members are satisfied that the value of the
total benefits that they have received from others sufficiently compensates them for the market
opening commitments that they have undertaken. LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 120, at 379.
158. Hoekman, supra note 133, at 925.
159. For example, Country A may offer better access to sector X in exchange for Country
B's agreement to provide better access in sector Y.
160. Dillon, supra note 67, at 11.
161. GATS Sched. GATS/SC/90 (on file with authors).
162. GATS Sched. GATS/SC/31 (on file with authors).
163. GATS Sched. GATS/SC/46 (on file with authors).
164. The following countries included legal services in their Schedules of Specific
Commitments: Antigua and Barbuda, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/2; Antilles (Netherlands), GATS
Sched. GATS/SC/3; Argentina, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/4; Aruba (Netherlands), GATS Sched.
GATS/SC/5; Australia, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/6; Austria, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/7;
Barbados, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/9; Canada, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/16; Chile, GATS
Sched. GATS/SC/18; Columbia, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/20; Cuba, GATS Sched.
GATS/SC/24; Czech Republic, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/26; Dominican Republic, GATS Sched.
GATS/SC/28; El Salvador, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/29; The EEC and its Member States,
GATS Sched. GATS/SC/31; Finland, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/33; Guyana, GATS Sched.
GATS/SC/37; Hungary, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/40; Iceland, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/41;
Israel, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/44; Jamaica, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/45; Japan, GATS Sched.
GATS/SC/46; Malaysia,. GATS Sched. GATS/SC/52; New Zealand, GATS Sched.
GATS/SC/62; Norway, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/66; Poland, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/71;
Romania, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/72; Slovak Republic, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/77; South
Africa, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/78; Sweden, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/82; Switzerland, GATS
Sched. GATS/SC/83; Liechtenstein, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/83-A; Thailand, GATS Sched.
GATS/SC/85; Trinidad and Tobago, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/86; Turkey, GATS Sched.
GATS/SC/88; United States, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/90; Venezuela, GATS Sched.
GATS/SC/92 (schedules on file with authors).
165. For example, the United States, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/31; the European Com-
munity, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/46; and Japan, GATS Sched. GATS/SC/90 merely list their
pre-GATS regulations in their schedule (on file with authors).
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While the GATS commitments do not reduce the level of protection
afforded to domestic lawyers, they at least inhibit the ability of countries
to tighten restrictions on foreign lawyers in the future.66
The inability of the Uruguay Round negotiations to bring about
significant liberalization of trade in legal services is not surprising. In
multilateral negotiations, it is difficult both to obtain meaningful com-
mitments on legal services and to ensure that liberalizing commitments
are implemented in a manner that does not unduly burden foreign
attorneys. Thus, the current structure of the GATS suggests that it is an
ineffective vehicle for liberalizing trade in legal services.
The primary impediments to the liberalization of trade in legal
services under the GATS are outlined below.
1. Obstacles to Obtaining Liberalizing Commitments
on Legal Services
Multilateral trade negotiations under the GATS cannot be expected
to generate substantial improvements in access for foreign lawyers to
Member legal markets for two fundamental reasons. First, offers of
improved access to domestic legal markets are expected to receive low
priority in the bartering process of a multilateral trade negotiation because
it is extremely difficult to ascertain the value of such concessions.
Second, concerns about reciprocity and the free-rider problem created by
the MFN obligation discourage Members from offering significant
improvements in access to their legal markets in the context of GATS
negotiations.
a. Difficulty in the Valuation of Concessions
in Legal Service Sectors
As discussed above, trade liberalization under the GATS is achieved
through a series of bilateral "request and offer" negotiations among the
Members. For this type of negotiation to succeed, each participant must
have a clear sense of the competitive strengths of its domestic industries
in order to predict the domestic impact of its offers as well as to deter-
mine whether other Members have made valuable offers. 167 This assess-
ment can be particularly difficult in service sector industries, because the
lack of dependable data often precludes reliable quantitative analysis.
1 61
166. GATS, supra note 6, art. XXI.
167. Arkell, supra note 136, at 10.
168. Id.
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Evaluating concessions in the legal services sector is complicated further
by the complexity of national regulatory systems. As will be discussed
below, the complexity of such systems creates uncertainty about the
practical effects of offers, and thus, about the value of such offers to
other Members. Consequently, offers in the legal services industry often
are given limited weight in the bartering process. 69 It is not surprising,
therefore, that "legal services suffer from being invariably at the bottom
of the [negotiating] agenda."'170
b. Reciprocity and MFN
The concerns of Members about reciprocity in light of the MFN
obligations under the GATS may represent the most formidable obstacle
to realizing a significant liberalization of trade in legal services through
GATS negotiations. As was noted above, previous attempts to liberalize
trade in legal services were frustrated by disputes over reciprocity.' 7' The
MFN obligation of the GATS magnifies the reciprocity problems.
The MFN obligation requires that any improvements in the access of
foreign lawyers to a Member's market must be applied to the lawyers of
all other Members. This creates two impediments to liberalizing trade in
legal services. First, the MFN clause raises the "free-rider" problem.
72
Little incentive exists for an individual Member to provide greater access
to its legal market if its lawyers will benefit automatically from any con-
cessions made by other Members.
7 1
Second, improving the access of foreign lawyers to the domestic
market in the presence of the MFN provision opens the door to lawyers
from every Member of the GATS, including lawyers with vastly different
training and backgrounds. Such an obligation threatens to undermine the
ability of domestic authorities and bar associations to ensure the quality
of legal service provided in the domestic market. In short, the MFN
obligation strongly discourages Members from offering concessions on
legal services in the context of GATS negotiations.
c. Practical Value of Commitments on Legal
Services is Doubtful
Even if Members agreed to schedule liberalizing commitments for the
legal services sector, the practical effect of such commitments for improv-
169. Dillon, supra note 67, at 11; Stewart, supra note 33, at 20.
170. Stewart, supra note 33, at 20.
171. See the discussion on reciprocity, supra part IV.A.
172. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 136-37 (1989).
173. Id. at 136.
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ing opportunities for lawyers to practice in foreign markets is
questionable under the GATS. The GATS contains language which a
Member could easily use to close effectively its legal market, even after
undertaking a specific commitment to the contrary. For example, the
National Treatment obligation governs a Member's treatment of "like
services and service suppliers" where a specific commitment has been
scheduled. Thus, service providers who are not considered to be "like"
domestic providers are not entitled to protection under the GATS.
Because substantial differences in education, training, and experience
requirements exist between lawyers of different countries, Members might
argue that domestic and foreign lawyers do not provide "like services"
and should not be considered "like service suppliers.' 75 As a con-
sequence, Members who have scheduled a National Treatment commit-
ment on legal services may potentially restrict foreign access to the
domestic legal market without violating their GATS obligations. The
potential for such abuse is likely to keep legal services at the bottom of
the GATS negotiating agenda'by undermining the confidence of Members
in the practical significance of any concessions on legal services.
b. The GATS as an Obstacle to Future Liberalization
of Trade in Legal Services
An important consequence of the problems outlined above is that
future liberalization of trade in legal services is not likely to occur within
the GATS framework. A second, and more striking, consequence is that
future liberalization of trade in legal services may not occur because of
the GATS framework.
Because the MFN obligation is a general obligation under the GATS,
it applies not only to the conduct of Members under the GATS but also
to conduct outside of the GATS. 76 As a result, when a GATS Member
lowers its trade barriers in a particular sector with respect to another
country, the lower barriers must be applied automatically to all GATS
Members, unless the reducing Member has invoked an MFN exemption
under the Annex on MFN Exemptions.
Few Members have invoked MFN exceptions in legal services.' 77
Therefore, any bilateral agreements to liberalize trade in legal services
involving GATS Members will force the liberalizing Members to relax
174. Id.
175. Menegas, supra note 31, at 285; see also JACKSON, supra note 172, at 138.
176. JACKSON, supra note 172, at 134.
177. See supra note 146.
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their restrictions governing all lawyers from all GATS Members. Given
the importance of reciprocity in negotiations involving trade in legal
services, this mandatory extension of improved access renders bilateral
agreements to liberalize such trade almost impossible.
c. Benefits of an Annex on Legal Services
The main obstacle to achieving a significant liberalization of trade in
legal services under the GATS is the tension between the approach to
liberalization embodied in the GATS and intense national concerns about
reciprocity. The creation of an annex on legal services could resolve this
tension and achieve a substantial liberalization of trade in legal services.
Under the GATS, annexes are integral parts of the agreement and are,
therefore, binding on all Members for the sector covered in the annex.'
Consequently, an annex-based approach to liberalizing trade would bring
about a coordinated reduction in obstacles to trade in legal services and
avoid many of the reciprocity-related problems that have frustrated
previous attempts.
V. PROPOSAL FOR ANNEX ON LEGAL SERVICES
In developing an Annex on Legal Services, two competing con-
siderations must be balanced. An Annex must allow national regulators
to retain sufficient regulatory control over their legal markets while simul-
taneously eliminating unreasonable and protectionist regulatory barriers.
Effectively balancing these considerations will allow lawyers from all
GATS Members a reasonable and practical opportunity to develop a
transnational legal practice while preserving national standards of quality.
This is the primary goal of the Annex on Legal Services proposed in this
Note.
Both the CCBE and the ABA have recently developed proposals that
attempt to strike an appropriate balance between opening legal markets
and preserving the integrity of domestic legal systems. These proposals,
briefly outlined below, are the CCBE's Draft Directive on Right of
Establishment for Foreign Lawyers'79 and the ABA's Model Rule for the
Licensing of Legal Consultants."' The Annex on Legal Services draws
upon these initiatives and adapts their provisions to the framework of the
GATS.
178. GATS, supra note 6, art. XXIX.
179. CCBE DRAFr DIRECTIVE, supra note 96.
180. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 207-12.
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A. CCBE: Draft Directive on the Right of Establishment
The purpose of the CCBE proposal was to complete the freedom of
movement of lawyers within the EU. 18t Under the CCBE Draft Directive,
any lawyer established in any Member State has the right to become
established in another Member State either as an integrated lawyer or as
a registered lawyer.8 2 An integrated lawyer is full member of the bar of
the host state. 8 3 In contrast, a registered lawyer is a full member of the
bar of the home state who chooses only to become established in the host
state under the home title. 8 4 Since integrated lawyers are full members
of the host bar, they are subject to essentially the same regulations that
apply to any attorney in the host country. 85 Consequently, the CCBE
Draft Directive is devoted primarily to establishing guidelines for the
regulation of registered lawyers.1
6
1. Scope of Permissible Practice
Under the CCBE Draft Directive, registered lawyers are permitted to
engage in most types of legal practice, including advising on the law of
the host jurisdiction."7 The CCBE Draft Directive permits the authorities
in the host jurisdiction to bar registered lawyers from preparing formal
documents which obtain title to administer estates of deceased persons or
which create or transfer interests in land.188 It also authorizes local
authorities to limit the ability of registered lawyers to participate in legal
proceedings.
8 9
181. Toulmin 1994, supra note 1, at 50. The opportunities created by the CCBE Draft
Directive will be available only to lawyers who are nationals of a Member State. CCBE DRAFr
DIRECTIVE, supra note 96, art. l(2)(a).
182. CCBE DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 96, arts. 2-4.
183. Id. art. 1(2)(d)-(t). An integrated lawyer may accede to full membership in the host
bar "normally, by virtue of his education or having taken a bar examination, or under the
Diploma Directive." Heinz Weil, The Proposal for a Directive on the Right of Establishment
for Lawyers in the European Community, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 699, 706 (1991-1992).
For the purposes of this Note, the home state is the country in which the lawyer is a
national and a member of the country's bar association. The host state is the country in which
the lawyer is seeking to enter.
184. CCBE DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 96, art. l(2)(d)--(f) & art. 4.
185. Weil, supra note 183, at 706; CCBE DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 96, art. 8.
186. CCBE DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 96, art. 8.
187. Weil, supra note 183, at 707-08.
188. CCBE DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 96, art. 6(1).
189. Id. art. 6(l)(a).
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2. Rights and Privileges of Registered Lawyers
The most important right that the CCBE Draft Directive confers is a
right of establishment, either as an integrated or as a registered lawyer,
anywhere in the EU.' 9 Once established, the lawyer has a right to be
included in any official list of lawyers published by the Member State
authority responsible for registration."
The CCBE Draft Directive also creates comprehensive rights of
association for lawyers of Member States. For example, it permits the
creation of branch offices."9 By implication, it also authorizes the use of
firm names. 93 Subject to host state rules regarding the form and sub-
stance of associations between lawyers, the CCBE Draft Directive also
authorizes the formation of associations which include both registered
lawyers with different home jurisdictions and lawyers from the host
jurisdiction.94 The rules governing any such association "shall be deter-
mined by the law of the host Member State."'95
3. Obligations of Registered Lawyers
An initial and important obligation imposed on registered lawyers is
a duty to register with the host authorities. 96 This duty involves not
only notifying the host authorities of the intent to establish but also
submitting evidence demonstrating the foreign lawyer's eligibility to
practice law. 97
A second significant obligation incurred by a registered lawyer is a
duty to carry on professional activities exclusively under the profession-
al title of the home jurisdiction.' 9 The registered lawyer also bears an
affirmative duty to "avoid any possibility of confusion with the lawyers
of the host Member State."' 99
190. Id. arts. 2-4. For an outline of the procedures in the CCBE Draft Directive on how
a lawyer becomes established in a foreign country, see supra part V.A.
191. Id. art. 5(2).
192. Id. arts. 1(h) & 11.
193. Weil, supra note 183, at 709; CCBE DitFr DIRECTIVE, supra note 96, art. 11(5).
194. CCBE DRAFt DIRECTIVE, supra note 96, art. 11(3).
195. Id.
196. Id. art. 5.
197. Id.
198. Id. art. 7(2).
199. Id.
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4. Ethics and Discipline
The final significant set of obligations incurred by registered lawyers
involves conforming to the applicable code of professional respon-
sibility. 200 The CCBE Draft Directive states that registered lawyers are
subject to the same obligations as the lawyers of the host Member State,
to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the CCBE Code.20' The
CCBE Code declares that "[a] lawyer shall not handle a matter which he
knows or ought to know he is not competent to handle, without cooper-
ating with a lawyer who is competent to handle it." 202 Registered law-
yers are deterred from offering incompetent advice because they can be
subject to discipline.
The disciplinary procedures outlined in the CCBE Draft Directive
call for substantial cooperation and communication between the authori-
ties in the home and host jurisdictions.2 3 In all disciplinary matters, the
attorney in question is potentially subject to scrutiny by authorities in
both jurisdictions.2°
B. ABA: Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consultants
In 1993, the ABA adopted a Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal
Consultants.2 5 The purpose of the rule was to encourage the establish-
ment of uniformity in state regulation of foreign legal consultants. 206
Believing that "artificial and unnecessary restrictions [on foreign at-
torneys] can only impair the ability of American lawyers [to compete in]
the international economy," the ABA hoped to encourage states to reduce
the severity of restrictions on foreign lawyers seeking to practice in the
United States.20 7
Under the Model Rule, any member of a recognized legal profession
in a foreign country, at the discretion of the state court, may be licensed
200. Id. art 8.
201. Id. art. 8(l).
202. CCBE CODE, supra note 88, Rule 3.1.3.
203. Id.
204. CCBE DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 96, arts. 9 & 10.
205. Model Rule, supra note 28.
206. As noted above, a number of states established rules regarding foreign legal
consultants in the latter part of the 1980s. Unfortunately, the rules adopted in different states
exhibited considerable variation. Id. at 215, 217.
207. Id. at 215.
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in the state as a legal consultant °8 Prerequisites to becoming licensed are
good moral character and proof of the intent to practice and maintain an
office in the state as a legal consultant.209 In deciding whether to grant the
license, the Model Rule allows state authorities to consider whether state
lawyers are permitted to practice in the requesting attorney's home
jurisdiction.1 Upon approval of their application, legal consultants become
"affiliated" with the local bar; they are not full members of the local bar.2 1
1. Scope of Permissible Practice
Under the Model Rule, states may prohibit legal consultants from (1)
representing clients in court, 2 (2) preparing any instrument effecting the
transfer or registration of real estate located in the U.S., (3) preparing will
or trust instruments involving property located in the U.S. or owned by
U.S. citizen, (4) preparing documents involving family law issues, or (5)
rendering advice on U.S. or local law.213
2. Rights and Privileges of Legal Consultants
Although legal consultants are not full members of the local bar, as
affiliated members they are extended many of the rights and privileges
that are accorded to full members.2 4 For example, all professional
privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege and the work-product rule,
may be invoked by legal consultants under the Model Rule.215
Furthermore, legal consultants enjoy the same rights of association and
partnership in law firms established within the state as full members of
the bar do.216
3. Obligations of Legal Consultants
A threshold obligation of persons seeking to be licensed as legal
consultants is that they must file the following documents with state
208. Id. at 208. The Model Rule also includes two optional eligibility requirements that
individual states may choose to enact. These are a legal experience requirement of 5 years and
a minimum age requirement of 26 years. Id.
209. Id.
210. State authorities are not required to consider the rules of the foreign attorney's home
jurisdiction. Id. at 209.
211. Id. at 210.
212. Legal consultants are permitted to appear before a court upon admission pro hac vice
pursuant to the established rules of the host courts. Id. at 209.
213. Id.
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authorities: (1) a statement of commitment to be bound by the state's
code of professional conduct and by the practice limitations of the legal
consultant's license, (2) evidence of professional liability insurance, (3)
a statement agreeing to notify state authorities of any change in the
lawyer's standing in the relevant home jurisdiction, and (4) an instrument
identifying the legal consultant's address and authorized agent within the
state jurisdiction.217
Once licensed, legal consultants are not permitted to hold themselves
out as members of the local bar.2 18 Instead, they must use either the title
"legal consultant" or the authorized title from their home jurisdiction." 9
4. Ethics and Discipline
As lawyers affiliated with the local bar, legal consultants are subject
to the same rules of professional conduct as full members.22° In addition,
they are subject to the same disciplinary procedures as regular bar
members.22'
C. Proposed Annex on Legal Services
The goal of the proposed Annex on Legal Services is to provide
lawyers from all GATS Members a reasonable opportunity to carry on a
transnational legal practice. To reach this goal, the Annex adapts many
of the substantive provisions of the CCBE and the ABA proposals to the
GATS framework. The Annex also establishes an institutional framework
for the regulation of transnational legal practice within the structure of the
GATS.
1. Overview of Proposed Annex on Legal Services
The proposed Annex consists of three components. The first addresses
the ability of a citizen of any GATS Member to become a lawyer in any
other GATS Member by imposing a narrowly defined National Treatment
obligation in the area of legal services. Second, the Annex establishes a
category of "Registered Legal Consultants" who are fully qualified
lawyers from one Member who are permitted to establish and practice
most types of law in the territory of another Member. Third, the Annex
sets out the institutional and procedural provisions for the operation of the
Annex. These three components are outlined below.
217. Id. at 210-11.
218. Id. at 209.
219. Id. at 209-10.
220. Id. at 210-11.
221. Id.
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a. National Treatment Obligation
Any citizen of any Member is eligible to become a fully qualified and
licensed lawyer in any other Member if the individual satisfies all
requirements for bar membership that the licensing Member applies to its
own citizens. Citizenship requirements for bar membership and limitations
on legal practice based on nationality are not permitted.
b. Registered Legal Consultants
Accredited legal professionals from any Member are eligible to
become Registered Legal Consultants in the territory of any other Mem-
ber. Registered Legal Consultants are affiliated members of the host bar
associations; they are not full members.
(i) Requirements For Licensing
Lawyers seeking to be licensed as Registered Legal Consultants must
register with the authorities in the host Member. The host authorities shall
establish and publish procedures for registration, which may include
requiring proof of the lawyer's qualifications to practice law in the
lawyer's home jurisdiction, proof of good moral character, and proof of
liability insurance. Registration procedures must be reasonable and must
not represent disguised protection.
(ii) Limitations on Scope of Practice
Host authorities may restrict the scope of the legal practice of
Registered Legal Consultants. An exhaustive list of such restrictions must
be published by each Member. Restrictions on the scope of practice of
Registered Legal Consultants must be reasonable and must not represent
disguised protection.
Host authorities may restrict the ability of Registered Legal Consul-
tants to offer advice on host country law and to represent clients in the
courts of the host country. These restrictions should not be used so as to
undermine the effectiveness of the Annex.
A Registered Legal Consultant may provide any legal services that
are not explicitly restricted by the host authorities.
(iii) Rights of Registered Legal Consultants
As affiliated members of the host bar association, Registered Legal
Consultants must be accorded all the rights and privileges of legal
Spring 19951
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professionals in the host jurisdiction, except for the limitations on the
scope of their practice.
The rights of Registered Legal Consultants include:
(a) the right of association with other members and affiliated
members of the host bar,
(b) the right to establish an office to engage in the practice of law,
(c) the right to use official firm names, and
(d) the right to be included in any official listing of bar members.
(iv) Obligations of Registered Legal Consultants
Registered Legal Consultants are bound by the host jurisdiction's
rules of professional ethics, to the extent that such rules are not incom-
patible with the GATS Common Code of Professional Conduct.222
Registered Legal Consultants have an affirmative duty to avoid any
possibility of confusion with the lawyers of the host Member. Registered
Legal Consultants must carry on their professional activities either under
the title of "Registered Legal Consultant" or the title of their home
jurisdictions.
(v) Discipline of Registered Legal Consultants
Registered Legal Consultants are subject to the same disciplinary
procedures and consequences as full members of the host bar. Host
authorities shall notify the authorities in the home jurisdiction of the
results of any proceedings involving a Registered Legal Consultant in the
host jurisdiction. Authorities in the home jurisdiction shall also notify
host authorities of the results of any disciplinary proceedings involving
the Registered Legal Consultant in the home jurisdiction.
c. Institutional Provisions
(i) Committee of Trade in Legal Services
The Council for Trade in Services shall establish a Committee on Trade
in Legal Services, which shall oversee the functioning of this Annex. 23
The primary responsibilities of the Committee are: (1) facilitating the
communication of credentials and other information among the Members
and (2) interpreting the GATS Common Code of Professional Conduct.
222. See infra part V.C.l.c.(ii).
223. The Committee on Trade in Legal Services is subsidiary to the Council on Trade in
Services and serves to facilitate the functioning of the proposed Annex [hereinafter Committee].
GATS, supra note 6, art. XXIV.
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(ii) GATS Common Code of Professional Conduct
The Members shall create a GATS Common Code of Professional
Conduct to be applied to Registered Legal Consultants. The GATS
Common Code of Professional Conduct shall establish principles for
resolving conflicts in the rules of professional conduct between different
Member jurisdictions.
(iii) Dispute Resolution
Panels for disputes on legal issues shall have the necessary knowl-
edge and expertise relevant to the dispute.
2. Implementation of the Annex on Legal Services
Implementation of an Annex on Legal Services would require an
amendment to the GATS.22 Under the terms of the WTO, the addition of
a new annex to the GATS requires two-thirds of the GATS Members to
accept the annex. 225 Upon acceptance by two-thirds of the Members, the
terms of the annex become binding on all Members of the GATS.226
CONCLUSION
Admittedly, the proposed Annex on Legal Services represents an
ambitious attempt to create an international regulatory regime to meet the
challenges of the evolving global legal market. The successful im-
plementation and operation of the Annex faces two significant obstacles.
First, the Annex requires the support of two-thirds of all Members of
the GATS. Given the difficulty of negotiations over legal services in the
Uruguay Round, obtaining the necessary support could prove to be a for-
midable task. Negotiators are likely to face some determined resistance
from their domestic constituents, particularly regarding the provisions
which give foreign lawyers the right of establishment and which call for
the creation of a Common Code of Professional Conduct. Even in the
United States, which has been one of the strongest proponents of the
liberalization of trade in legal services, one might expect some resistance
224. GAT'7, Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization [World Trade
Organization], Doc. MTN/FA, pt. II, art. X (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter
WTO].
225. WTO, supra note 224, art. X.
226. Id. art. X(5).
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to the creation of the proposed Annex. 27 Second, even if the necessary
support were secured for implementation of the Annex, its ultimate suc-
cess will require an exceptionally high level of cooperation among
national authorities. This degree of interaction and interdependence of
national bar associations is unprecedented.
Despite these obstacles, we believe that the prospects for the creation
and implementation of an Annex on Legal Services under the GATS are
positive. Although a more conservative effort might arguably be more
attractive in the current political environment, such an approach would be
inadequate. In the absence of an ambitious multilateral effort, "the world
can look forward to a growing tide of professional protectionism and
petty squabbling amongst lawyers of different nations. '' 12' Thus, it is
imperative that national authorities embark on a decisive and concerted
effort to change the regulation of foreign lawyers, because:
[a]fter years and even decades of relative inaction and inertia on the
part of the legal profession in the face of rapid changes in the
structure of the global economy, the face of the legal profession is
now being altered at a stunning pace ... throughout the world. We
have a small window of opportunity to influence that change. If we
fail to do so, the process will unquestionably go forward without
US.
229
Negotiating and implementing an Annex on Legal Services under the
GATS will be the critical first step in the right direction.
227. Because its membership would face greater competition, the ABA has not always
supported far-reaching efforts to liberalize trade in legal services. Model Rule, supra note 28,
at 217. Instead the ABA has focused on more modest proposals, such as the Model Rule.
228. Stewart, supra note 33, at 22.
229. Model Rule, supra note 28, at 236.
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